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**Strong logics of first and second order. (English summary)**

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The paper is a natural follow-up to ideas introduced in [J. A. Väänänen, *Bull. Symbolic Logic* **7** (2001), no. 4, 504–520; [MR1867954 \(2002m:03010\)](#)]. It begins with a study of common features of  $\omega$ -logic and  $\beta$ -logic, two logics usually studied in the context of second-order arithmetic and set theory that extend first-order logic. Isolating these features leads to the notion of *strong logic*, which is the main concern of the paper. Many interesting results (some well known) are discussed along the way, for example, the partial order of *interpretability* of theories.

Abstractly, a strong logic  $\models_{\Phi}$  (of first order) can be identified with a collection of pairs  $(T, \varphi)$ , where  $T$  is a (recursively enumerable) theory and  $\varphi$  is a sentence. We write  $T \models_{\Phi} \varphi$  to mean that  $(T, \varphi)$  is a pair in the logic. The statement  $\Phi(x)$  describes a class of *test structures* that are used to decide which pairs satisfy this relation, so that  $T \models_{\Phi} \varphi$  iff for all  $M$  such that  $\Phi(M)$ , if  $M \models T$ , then  $M \models \varphi$ . The class of test structures can be quite general, and include Boolean-valued models.

The key features that the paper focuses on are generic invariance and faithfulness. Both notions depend on the background theory of sets, which typically is assumed to contain large cardinals. Given an extension  $\text{ZFC}^{(+)}$  of ZFC, the logic  $\models_{\Phi}$  is said to be *generically invariant in  $\text{ZFC}^{(+)}$*  when, for all  $T$  and  $\varphi$ , we have that, provably in  $\text{ZFC}^{(+)}$ ,  $T \models_{\Phi} \varphi$  iff  $V^{\mathbb{P}} \models "T \models_{\Phi} \varphi"$  for any forcing notion  $\mathbb{P}$ . We say that  $\models_{\Phi}$  is *faithful in  $\text{ZFC}^{(+)}$*  when, for all  $T$  and  $\varphi$ , we have that, provably in  $\text{ZFC}^{(+)}$ ,  $\emptyset \models_{\Phi} \varphi$  iff  $V^{\mathbb{P}} \models \varphi$  for all forcing notions  $\mathbb{P}$ .

The study of these logics naturally requires the use of notions familiar to set theorists, such as universal Baireness, and cannot be separated completely from set-theoretic considerations, usually coming from the study of the large cardinal hierarchy. Ultimately, this leads to a new presentation of Woodin's  $\Omega$ -logic [see W. H. Woodin, *The axiom of determinacy, forcing axioms, and the nonstationary ideal*, de Gruyter Ser. Log. Appl., 1, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1999; [MR1713438 \(2001e:03001\)](#)].

The study of the appropriate version of these notions for second-order logic supports, in the author's view, the claim in [W. V. O. Quine, *Philosophy of logic*, second edition, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986; [MR0844769 \(87f:03016\)](#)] that second-order logic is "set theory in sheep's clothing". One of the key issues is that full second-order logic is generically fragile, even in the context of large cardinals.

Reviewed by [Andrés Eduardo Caicedo](#)

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*Note: This list, extracted from the PDF form of the original paper, may contain data conversion errors, almost all limited to the mathematical expressions.*